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Abstract 
 
Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson (2002) have claimed that the world income 
distribution underwent a "Reversal of Fortune" from 1500 to the present, whereby 
formerly rich countries in what is now the developing world became poor while 
poor ones grew rich. We question their analysis with regard to both of their proxies 
for pre-modern income, namely urbanization and population density. First, an 
alternative measure of urbanization with more observations generates a positive (but 
not significant) correlation between pre-modern and contemporary income. Second, 
we show that their measure of population density as a proxy is highly flawed 
inasmuch as it does not properly measure density on arable land, and when 
corrected with better data the relationship is no longer robust. At best our results 
demonstrate a Reversal of Fortune only for the four neo-Europes of Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States; at worst, we show no Reversal for 
other former colonies. 
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1 Introduction
In a seminal paper Acemoglu et al. (2002) argue that countries in the devel-
oping world have experienced a "Reversal of Fortune," whereby those which
were previously rich in the pre-colonial era have become poor, while those
that were poor are now rich. Rather than explaining this reversal through
geographic factors, they claim that di¤erent sets of institutions imposed by
colonial rule resulted in di¤ering patterns of industrialization over the past
two hundred years, and that this phenomenon happened across the colonial
world, regardless of the nature of the colonial power. Their thesis has drawn
a great deal of attention due to its strong emphasis on European colonial
rule as the major explanation for divergence in the modern world income
distribution.
Naturally the biggest problem with any analysis of long-term income
trends is the lack of accurate data on pre-modern income levels. Acemoglu
et al. (2002) (henceforth AJR) proxy for pre-modern income in two ways,
namely urbanization and population density. In both cases they argue that a
higher value represents a higher aggregate income inasmuch as only societies
with high incomes could support urban and dense populations.1
In this paper, however, we question their data for these two proxies of pre-
colonial income. First, their measure of urbanization contains no data from
Africa and thus consists of only 41 observations; when we use an alternative
measure of urbanization with 71 observations from Africa and the Americas
the relationship disappears and even changes sign. Second, despite their
claims to the contrary their data on population density does not properly
account for arable land, and, when corrected with better data, their results
collapse across a number of econometric specications. We use standard
Ordinary Least Squares regression approaches as done by AJR.
We therefore not only suggest that AJRs analysis does not hold on a
global scale but o¤er two specic reasons for this result. First, in no speci-
cations do the data show a reversal within Africa, thereby suggesting that
Africas poverty was largely untouched by colonialism. Secondly, the results
are largely driven by the four Neo-Europes, which, when excluded, render the
relationship between pre-colonial income and contemporary GDP per capita
either weakly signicant or not signicant. Thus, while we do not rule out a
Reversal of Fortune among select countries, our results suggest that whatever
reversal took place was not a generalized phenomenon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
1Moreover, they are not alone in using these proxies; other recent literature to use one
or both measures include Huillery (2009) and Oster (2004).
1
the di¤erences between AJRs data on urbanization and population density
and ours. In Section 3 we present our new empirical results of regressing
contemporary income levels on these two proxies of pre-modern incomes. We
then o¤er an interpretation of the results in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Description of the Data
2.1 Urbanization
The rst proxy used by AJR for income in 1500 is urbanization, or more
specically the percentage of a given population living in cities. They use
data on urbanization from Bairoch (1988) and Eggimann (1999) by sup-
plementing Bairoch (1988)s data on cities greater than 5000 people with
Eggimann (1999)s estimates of cities larger than 20,000 people and then
converting Eggimann (1999)s data to a 5000-person minimum. They claim
in an earlier version that 5000 people is a much better threshold as it ac-
counts for a greater number of small pre-modern cities (Acemoglu, Johnson,
& Robinson, 2001; Appendix A, p. 1).
However, it is no accident that both Chandler (1987) and Eggimann
(1999) only list data on pre-modern cities greater than 20,000 people as
the data on pre-modern urbanization in the developing world is remarkably
poor. Indeed, Bairoch (1988, p. 520) himself notes that "given the current
state of data and research, it is impossible in the case of most countries to
assemble gures on urban population su¢ ciently complete to give a valid
indication of the population of all cities with more than ve thousand;" he
indicated that his future e¤orts would be directed at lowering the population
threshold to 8000 people for Europe.2 Historians agree that data on small
ancient cities can be inaccurate for the reasons that abandoned cities can
disappear over time, migration routes can make it di¢ cult to measure cities
permanent populations and much archaeological work on ancient cities in
the tropics remains to be done (Connah, 2001; Hopkins, 2009). Thus even
Chandler (1987)s comprehensive data lacks population gures for 18 of the
60 cities he identies in Africa and the Americas in 1500.
To correct for these problems we use Chandler (1987)s data on cities
of 20,000 or more for Africa and the Americas. Far from being idiosyn-
cratic, the 20,000 benchmark determinant for urbanization is currently used
by such countries as Nigeria and was used for a period by the United Na-
2As acknowledged by Acemoglu et al. (2001, Appendix A, p. 1), Bairoch did not
complete this work before he died in 1999, let alone move on to completing a dataset of
all pre-modern cities greater than 5000 people.
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tions; economists and economic historians who have used it as well include
Annable (1972), Berry (1961), Hoselitz (1957) and Long (2005), among oth-
ers. Moreover, using Chandler (1987) as our source has several advantages.
First, unlike AJRs use of both Bairoch (1988) and Eggimann (1999), all
of our data originates from a single source. Second, by using data directly
from its source we avoid the need to convert it and thereby open ourselves
to criticism of the conversion process.3 Third and nally, this data allows us
to include data on Africa in 1500 in our regressions. While AJR decided to
exclude African data because they claim that it was not "detailed" enough
(Acemoglu et al., 2002, p. 1238), Chandler (1987)s data contains 43 cities
in Africa for 1500, or more than twice as many as in the Americas (with 17
cities). Moreover, Chandler (1987, p. 6) himself notes that, thanks to 16th-
century data on African cities from Leo Africanus, "Africa at 1500 stands as
one of the best-prepared lists in this book." While using Chandler (1987)s
data means that we lose our observations from Asia, where Chandler (1987)
only lists cities larger than 40,000, by adding Africa we improve the number
of observations from 41 in AJR to 71 here.
2.2 Population Density
The second proxy used by AJR for pre-modern income is population density.
For their data AJR calculate population density on arable land for the simple
reason that including non-arable land would make pre-modern states like an-
cient Egypt appear very thinly populated and thus not very rich. They take
their data on arable land from McEvedy & Jones (1978), with the claim that
doing so "excludes primarily desert, inland water and tundra" (Acemoglu
et al., 2002, p. 1243). However, while McEvedy & Jones (1978) sometimes
present data on arable land for various countries, in 78 of the 83 observations
used in AJR they list no data on arable land, leading AJR to assume all land
as arable for these observations. Yet this assumption is highly problematic
in a large number of countries like Australia, Botswana and Canada which
have large tracts of non-cultivable frozen tundra, deserts and mountains.
To correct for this error we employ here data from the FAO (2000), which
for the rst time estimated global data for land that is potentially arable
(or potentially cultivable) for growing any one of twenty-one major crops
under rainfed conditions, thus making it suitable for assessing population
densities in 1500 when modern agricultural practices were not yet in use.
Much of this potential arable land (henceforth PAL) are currently under
3For instance, AJR use Zipfs law as one way to convert the data, despite the fact
that recent evidence suggests that Zipfs law does not apply widely across countries (Soo,
2005).
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Country Arable Potential Equivalent Potential
Land Arable Land Arable Land
Canada 100% 12.7% 7.7%
Botswana 100 15.8 8.7
Australia 100 16.2 10.9
South Africa 100 23 14.7
Laos 100 25.4 15.9
Kenya 100 26.8 16.6
Rwanda 100 30 19
New Zealand 100 32.5 20.1
USA 100 37.5 28.5
Table 1: Selected Discrepancies in Arable Land Measurements, in percent-
ages (Source: (Acemoglu et al., 2002; FAO, 2000))
pasture or constitute forests whose clearing would imperil local ecologies,
but for simplicitys sake we assume that all PAL could be cultivated. We
also examine a more stringent denition of PAL called "equivalent potential
arable land" (EPAL) which downgrades marginal land proportional to its
suitability for agriculture.4
We can see the di¤erences between select countries estimated by AJR
as having 100% of their land as arable and the FAO data in Table 1. The
disparities are stark, especially in neo-colonies and Africa. In fact, the FAOs
estimates of PAL may be overly generous in some cases. For instance, the
Canada Land Directory grades soil quality from level 1 to level 7, where levels
1-4 are suitable for permanent agriculture land, levels 5 and 6 are suitable for
grazing and level 7 is land unsuitable for agriculture; it estimates that only
10.3% of Canadas land falls within levels 1-5, and only 5.0% within levels
1-3 (Canada Land Inventory, 1976). Similarly, the Botswanan Ministry of
Agriculture estimated only 5.2% of its land to be cultivable in the 1970s,
with only 1% of land under cultivation at any one point (Alverson, 1984).
Thus, in at least these two cases, EPAL is a better reection of cultivable
land than PAL.
Another way to assess the accuracy of the FAO data is to compare it to
those cases where McEvedy & Jones (1978) compute arable land for given
countries.5 For instance, AJR calculate only 11.4% of Sudans land as cul-
4Where one hectare of very suitable, suitable, moderately suitable and marginal land
are counted as 1.0, 0.7, 0.5 and 0.3 hectares, respectively.
5In fact, McEvedy & Jones (1978) do not have a single metric like the FAO for poten-
tially arable land; instead they variously list gures for "cultivated" (Egypt), "productive"
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tivable based on McEvedy & Jones (1978)s calculations of arable and pasture
land i.e., land already in some form of use by farmers or pastoralists. Yet,
as elsewhere in Africa, Sudan has historically had low population densities
that were not able to fully exploit its large tracts of cultivable land. Its large
reserves of available fertile land contributed to its reputation in the 1970s
as the potential "Breadbasket of the Middle East," which led to subsequent
attempts to use land more productively despite ongoing war and poor gov-
ernance. Thus the FAOs calculation of 867,000 Km2 of PAL or 35% of
all land is closer to other estimates of 840,000 and 810,000 Km2 from El-
Farouk (1996) and Kaikati (1980), respectively, than the mere 300,000 km2
calculated by McEvedy & Jones (1978).6
3 Empirical Analysis
With these new data on urbanization and arable land we can now re-estimate
AJRs models. We should note, however, several changes to the dataset.
First, eight Caribbean countries included in the AJR paper could not be
included here due to a lack of data on potential arable land, namely the
Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia,
St. Vincent and Trinidad and Tobago. AJR also lack data on population
densities for these countries, but assume that they have the same popula-
tion density as the Dominican Republic. We could do the same here but
see no reason why we should assume that these countries, which have a
combined population of 2.4 million people, had population densities on po-
tential arable land in 1500 closer to the Dominican Republic (PAL density
of 3.2) than to Jamaica (32.1). Second, we have also included other former
European colonies with a combined population of 41.5 million people that
were inexplicably not included in the AJR analysis, namely Cambodia, Dji-
bouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Yemen.7 Third, inasmuch as
the "Reversal of Fortune" argument involves the transition from pre-colonial
occupation to colonial domination and then post-colonial independence, we
exclude three countries included in AJR which should not have been in their
analysis, namely Cape Verde (which had no human occupants prior to colo-
nialization) and Ethiopia and Nepal (neither of which were colonized by
(Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), and "pasture" and "arable" (Sudan) land. For more crit-
icism of McEvedy & Jones (1978) see Austin (2008b) and Hopkins (2009).
6Sudans EPAL is 629,450 Km2, which is still closer to these other estimates than the
sum from McEvedy & Jones (1978).
7As with AJR (p. 1244), we exclude from the analysis countries colonized in the 20th
century for the reason that their colonial experience was too short to have an impact on
long-term economic growth patterns.
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Europeans). Fourth and nally, we added countries which were colonized by
Europeans after 1500 and lie in Europe, namely Cyprus (under UK adminis-
tration 1878-1960) and Malta (UK administration, 1814-1964). Descriptive
statistics for our variables are presented in Table 9 in the Appendix.
We also use three geographical controls in our analysis, namely average
latitude, average distance to coastline and average elevation per country,
which are similar to the control variables used by AJR.8
3.1 Urbanization
In Figures 1 and 2 we plot log GDP per capita in 1995 against the urbaniza-
tion variable used by AJR and our new urbanization variable, CHANDLER,
respectively. In Figure 1, the OLS t suggests a negative relationship be-
tween the two variables. However, in Figure 2, the OLS t suggests a positive
relationship, but the t is clearly very poor.
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Figure 1: Log GDP per Capita (PPP) in 1995 against Urbanization Rate in
1500, AJR
8We have also used a number of other controls from the literature on long-term economic
growth patterns (Bockstette et al., 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Olsson and Hibbs,
2005; Putterman, 2008), with no changes in our results.
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Figure 2: Log GDP per Capita (PPP) in 1995 against Urbanization Rate in
1500, Chandler
In Table 2, we present the results for OLS regressions of log GDP per
capita (PPP) in 1995 on urbanization. The basic model we estimate is:
GDPi = + Urbanizationi + "i
whereGDPi is log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 for country i, Urbanizationi
is the Chandler urbanization estimate for country i; and "i is an error term
assumed to be normally distributed. In Panel A we present the results with
the full sample and the continent sub-samples. The rst column records the
result with the urbanization variable used by AJR, yielding a negative and
signicant coe¢ cient. In column 2 (and all columns hereafter) we use the
Chandler urbanization variable and nd that the urbanization coe¢ cient is
positive and no longer signicant in our full sample. In column 3 we re-run
the regression after dropping observerations with urbanization equal to zero
and nd a positive and signicant relationship. This result suggests that, for
those countries which had some level of urbanization in 1500, there exists a
positive relationship between income per-capita in 1500 and 1995, albeit one
which is not robust to our three geographical controls (not reported here).9
9Namely, average latitude, average distance to coastline and average elevation per coun-
try.
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When we split the sample by continents, as also done by AJR, we ob-
tain di¤erent results for each continent group. We nd that the relationship
remains signicant for the Africa sub-sample (column 4), although this re-
sult is not signicant upon adding geographical controls (not reported here).
Column 5 demonstrates a weakly signicant and negative coe¢ cient in the
sample excluding Africa; however, as before the coe¢ cient is not signicant
after the controls are added (also not reported). We also present results in
columns 6-9 for sub-samples excluding the Neo-Europes (Canada and the US
only, as our data does not include Australia and New Zealand), and for sub-
samples of former French, Spanish and British colonies. We obtain a weakly
positive and signicant relationship between urbanization and log GDP for
the sample excluding the Neo-Europes, and an insignicant relationship in all
other sub-samples. We also test for a sub-sample of former British colonies
excluding the two Neo-Europes (not reported here), with similar results.10
To check to see if we are ignoring smaller cities, we can assume that
the aforementioned 18 cities listed by Chandler (1987) for Africa and the
Americas that do not have population gures have the minimum level of
20,000 people per city. We rerun our regressions, presented in Panel B; for
none of the sub-samples do we obtain a negative and signicant coe¢ cient
for the Urbanization Max variable. The only di¤erences between Panels A
and B are that the sub-sample excluding zero values for urbanization, our
Africa sub-sample and without Africa sub-sample regressions lose some of
their signicance.
10This sub-sample thus includes such countries as Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya and
Zimbabwe, among others.
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Thus, in using the Chandler denition of urbanization we observe that
the Reversal of Fortune result obtained by AJR does not hold. To summarize
our ndings:
 The relationship between urbanization and log GDP per capita is not
signicant for the (African and American) full sample and all but one
sub-sample.
 The relationship is positive and signicant for the sub-samples exclud-
ing zero values of urbanization and for our Africa sub-sample. However,
this result is not robust to the inclusion of geographical controls.
 These results hold whether we include or exclude the 18 cities listed by
Chandler (1987) that do not have population gures.
3.2 Population Density
In this section we observe the relationship between population density and
log GDP. The results obtained here are mixed compared to what we ob-
tained using the urbanization variable. The following gures plot log GDP
per capita in 1995 against population density in 1500; rst, in Figure 3 for
population density variable used by AJR, and in Figure 4 for our new popula-
tion density variable, PAL. We observe a clear negative relationship in Figure
3. However, in Figure 4, while the plot generates a similar negative sloping
OLS t, it appears to be driven by specic data points. To isolate the e¤ects
of certain countries, we will therefore not just test for the relationship using
the full sample data, but using sub-samples of countries, described below.We
estimate OLS regressions of log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 on our new
population density variables. The basic model we estimate is:
GDPi =  + PopulationDensityi + i
whereGDPi is log GDP per capita (PPP) in 1995 for country i, PopulationDensityi
is the population density estimate for country i; and i is an error term as-
sumed to be normally distributed. Table 3 presents the results for the con-
tinent specic sub-samples and the former colony sub-samples. In Panel A
columns 1 and 2 present the results with the AJR denition of population
density and the FAO corrected-denition of population density, respectively.
While in both cases there is a negative and signicant relationship, the size
of the coe¢ cient for the FAO population density variable is less than half
of the coe¢ cient of the AJR variable. Moreover, the goodness of t (the
R2) of the FAO variable regression is less than a third than that of the AJR
10
Figure 3: Log GDP per Capita (PPP) against Log Population Density in
1500, AJR
Figure 4: Log GDP per Capita (PPP) against Log Population Density in
1500, FAO
11
variable regression. Column 3 presents the results with the FAO variable
and geography controls, and the relationship remains negative and signi-
cant. However, the following sub-samples obtain mixed results. While the
coe¢ cient is negative and strongly signicant for the sample without Africa
(column 4), it is not signicant for only Africa (column 5). For the sample
without the Americas in column 6 the relationship is again not signicant,
and barely signicant for the sample with only the Americas (Column 7).
In Panel B we present the regressions with the former colony sub-samples.
While AJR nd that for the sample excluding the four Neo-Europes results in
a signicant relationship (t-statistic = 5:33)11, in our sample the same sub-
sample generates a barely signicant relationship (with t-statistic = 1:9).
The relationship is not signicant for former French and Spanish colonies in
columns 2 and 3, respectively. In column 4 the relationship is again signcant
for former British colonies, but becomes insignicant when the Neo-Europes
are dropped from the sub-sample in column 5.
For robustness, we run the same regressions using EPAL. We observe
a similar set of relationships between population density and log GDP in
Table 4. In the full sample equivalent population density has a negative and
signicant relationship with log GDP, with similar results for the sub-sample
without Africa; however it is not signicant in the sub-samples of only Africa
and without the Americas. When excluding Neo-Europes it is again weakly
signicant and is not signicant for sub-samples of former French and Spanish
colonies, and former British colonies excluding the Neo-Europes.
As with AJR we also estimate the above regressions using population den-
sity per kilometer of potential arable land in the year 1000 as an instrument
for PAL. Table 5 lists our Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) results, which
correspond exactly to the same results we found with the PAL and EPAL
variables previously. The relationship is negative and signicant for the full
sample but not for most of the sub-samples.
11Table V, p. 1250, Acemoglu et al (2002).
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Our results in Tables 3 - 5 thus suggest that the relationship between
population density in 1500 and contemoprary GDP per capita is not robust.
We can now summarise our ndings:
 The relationship between population density and log GDP per capita
is negative and signicant for the full sample, the sample excluding
Africa, and the sample with former British colonies.
 It is weakly signicant for the sample of the Americas and the sample
excluding the Neo-Europes.
 It is not signicant for the sub-samples of Africa, the sample exclud-
ing the Americas and the sub-samples of former French, Spanish, and
British colonies excluding the Neo-Europes.
 Our results are robust for both the PAL and EPAL variables, and the
IV regressions.
4 Interpretation
In using new population density and urbanization data we nd two con-
sistent results. First, the data suggests that the Reversal of Fortune thesis
fails to work for African countries, which together comprise a majority of our
and AJRs sample. This nding adds to and corresponds with a long liter-
ature on Africa which suggests that the continent was already poor before
the advent of formal colonialism in the late 19th century, whether due to the
slave trade (Nunn, 2008), low population densities (Austin, 2008a; Green,
2010), malaria (Bhattacharyya, 2009; Bloom & Sachs, 1998) or ethnic di-
versity (Birchenall, 2009; Easterly & Levine, 1997), among other possible
factors. It also corresponds to a recent literature suggesting an ambiguous
and sometimes positive e¤ect of colonial rule on development in Africa, es-
pecially as regards population growth, height and nutrition (Clapham, 2006;
Moradi, 2009). As suggested by (Hopkins, 2009), more work on African eco-
nomic history is thus necessary to help tease out the e¤ects of colonialism on
long-term economic growth.
Our second consistent nding is a lack of a reversal among former
French and Spanish colonies, accounting for 49% of the sample. While we can
explain the former case by the fact that 19 of 23 former French colonies were
in Africa, only 2 of 19 former Spanish colonies were outside the Americas.12
12Namely, Equatorial Guinea and the Philippines.
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This disparity among colonial powers is not surprising, however, consider-
ing the voluminous literature on the di¤erent e¤ects of colonial powers on
post-colonial economic and political development (Bertocchi & Canova, 2002;
Blanton, Mason, & Athow, 2001; Grier, 1999; Lange, Mahoney, & Vom Hau,
2006). There is some evidence in our results that this disparity is a result of
the Neo-Europes, but, as with our results for Africa, this remains a topic for
further investigation.
5 Conclusion
This paper has questioned the empirical analysis of AJRs Reversal of For-
tune thesis, specically as regards their use of both pre-colonial urbanization
and population density as proxies for pre-modern income. We found in both
cases that alternative and more appropriate measurements of both proxies
fail to generate a robust negative relationship between income in 1500 and
contemporary GDP per capita with appropriate levels of statistical signi-
cance, and in the case of urbanization the coe¢ cient even changes signs to
suggest a positive relationship.
With our urbanization data we did not nd any strong evidence of the Re-
versal thesis for either our full sample of countries or any of our sub-samples.
With our population density variables our full sample supported the Reversal
thesis but several sub-samples did not, namely those that exclude the Amer-
icas and include only African countries, former French and Spanish colonies
and former British colonies without Neo-Europes. At best these results sug-
gest that a Reversal took place among certain countries, especially in the
Neo-Europes; at worst our results suggest a total lack of a Reversal among
most countries in our sample.
Our point here is not to suggest that the Reversal of Fortune argument is
entirely incorrect. There exists a great deal of evidence to suggest that India,
for instance, had higher wages than many parts of western Europe in the
16th and 17th centuries, but that over the next three centuries Indian wages
dropped while European wages increased dramatically (Allen, 2005). Other
recent more qualitative work on the subject has agreed with certain aspects
of the Reversal hypothesis even though it suggests alternative mechanisms
(Bayly, 2008; Lange et al., 2006). Our evidence, however, suggests that
that this Reversal was not a global phenomenon, especially in Africa and
among former French and Spanish colonies. This result is also in line with
Przeworski (2004)s critique of AJR where he observes a Reversal only for
the four Neo-Europes (or what he calls the "British o¤-shoots"). Certainly
future scholars would benet from further investigations into the nature of
17
this Reversal and its causes.
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Population Population Population
Urban (%) Urban (%) Density Density Density
Country AJR Chandler AJR PAL EPAL
Algeria 14 11.0 7.0 11.7 19.6
Angola 0.5 1.5 2.1 3.1
Argentina 0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4
Australia 0 0.0 0.2 0.2
Bangladesh 8.5 23.7 45.2 55.4
Belize 9.2 8.8 1.5 4.4 6.5
Benin 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Bolivia 10.6 0.0 0.8 1.5 2.0
Botswana 0.0 0.1 1.0 1.7
Brazil 0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Burkina Faso 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Burundi 0.0 25.0 57.9 94.3
Cambodia 12.3 16.3
Cameroon 0.5 1.5 2.1 3.1
Canada 0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
CAR 0.5 1.5 2.1 3.1
Chad 5.5 1.0 4.2 6.3
Chile 0 0.0 0.8 18.0 30.0
Colombia 7.9 2.0 1.0 1.5 2.1
Congo D. R. 0.5 1.5 2.1 3.1
Congo Rep. 0.5 1.5 2.1 3.1
Costa Rica 9.2 8.8 1.5 4.4 6.5
Cote dIvoire 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Cyprus 0.0 46.2 79.4
Djibouti 0.0 33.6 78.7
Dominican Rep. 3 0.0 1.5 3.2 4.9
Ecuador 10.6 5.0 2.2 4.7 6.5
Egypt 14.6 10.9 100.5 3305.8 6779.7
El Salvador 9.2 8.8 1.5 4.4 6.5
Eq. Guinea 0.5 2.1 3.1
Eritrea 0.0 2.0 4.6 6.8
Gabon 0.5 1.5 2.1 3.1
Gambia 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Ghana 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Guatemala 9.2 8.8 1.5 4.4 6.5
Guinea 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Guinea-Bissau 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Guyana 0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5
Table 6: Appendix A: Urbanization and Population Density in 150022
Population Population Population
Urban (%) Urban (%) Density Density Density
Country AJR Chandler AJR PAL EPAL
Haiti 3 0.0 1.3 3.5 5.9
Honduras 9.2 8.8 1.5 4.4 6.5
Hong Kong 3 0.1 20.8 29.4
India 8.5 23.7 45.2 55.4
Indonesia 7.3 4.3 10.9 15.7
Jamaica 3 0.0 4.6 32.1 46.3
Kenya 0.0 2.6 9.5 15.3
Laos 7.3 1.7 6.8 10.9
Lesotho 0.0 0.5 2.1 3.2
Madagascar 0.0 1.2 2.0 3.1
Malawi 0.0 0.8 1.1 1.7
Malaysia 7.3 1.2 3.0 4.2
Mali 5.5 1.0 4.2 6.3
Malta 0.0 51.3 76.9
Mauritania 5.5 3.0 4.2 6.3
Mexico 14.8 7.1 2.6 9.6 13.7
Morocco 17.8 21.0 9.1 12.2 19.6
Mozambique 0.0 1.3 1.6 2.3
Namibia 0.0 0.1 1.0 1.7
New Zealand 3 0.4 0.6 0.9
Nicaragua 9.2 8.8 1.5 4.4 6.5
Niger 5.5 1.0 4.2 6.3
Nigeria 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Pakistan 8.5 23.7 45.2 55.4
Panama 9.2 8.8 1.5 4.4 6.5
Paraguay 0 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.5
Peru 10.5 2.5 1.6 4.6 6.5
Philippines 3 1.7 5.4 7.4
Rwanda 0.0 25.0 57.9 94.3
Senegal 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Sierra Leone 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Singapore 3 0.1 3.0 4.2
South Africa 0.0 0.5 2.1 3.2
Sri Lanka 8.5 15.5 26.9 32.4
Sudan 0.5 14.0 4.6 6.4
Suriname 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.5
Swaziland 0.0 0.5 2.1 3.2
Tanzania 1.7 2.0 2.6 3.8
Table 7: Appendix A: Urbanization and Population Density in 1500, contin-
ued
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Population Population Population
Urban (%) Urban (%) Density Density Density
Country AJR Chandler AJR PAL EPAL
Togo 1.3 4.2 6.0 8.3
Tunisia 12.3 8.1 11.7 24.2 38.6
Uganda 0.0 7.5 10.6 15.3
Uruguay 0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
USA 0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Venezuela 0 0.0 0.4 0.7 1.0
Vietnam 7.3 6.1 17.3 25.6
Yemen 45000.0 112500.0
Zambia 0.0 0.8 1.1 1.7
Zimbabwe 0.0 0.8 1.1 1.7
Table 8: Appendix A: Urbanization and Population Density in 1500, contin-
ued
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